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Extraterritorial Application of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus After Boumediene: With Separation of 
Powers Comes Individual Rights* 
For if this Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, 
it must not wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the 
forces of tyranny. 
- Justice Stevens1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Lakhdar Boumediene was first arrested on suspicion of plotting to 
bomb the U.S. Embassy in October of 2001 in Bosnia.2  More than seven 
years later, Boumediene is still in custody at Guantanamo Bay.  
Boumediene was arrested along with five other Algerian men at the 
request of the U.S. Embassy.3  The Bosnian Police conducted a three-
month investigation of the men, including a search of their homes, 
computers, and other documents.4  At the conclusion of the investigation, 
the Bosnian Supreme Court ordered their release for lack of evidence, at 
which time the U.S. government stepped in and took custody of the men, 
Boumediene included.5  The U.S. government transported the men to the 
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay on the night of January 17, 2002.6  
Finally, in October of 2008, the U.S. government dropped the charges 
regarding the embassy bombing, yet kept the Algerian men in custody, 
claiming the men had intended to go to Afghanistan to wage war against 
the United States.7  After nearly seven years of detention at Guantanamo, 
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 1. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 2. Profiles: Odah and Boumediene, BBC NEWS, Dec. 4, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
americas/7120713.stm. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Peter Finn, Three Algerian Detainees Set for Transfer to Bosnia, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 
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and months after the landmark case bearing his name was handed down, 
Boumediene’s release was finally ordered8—yet Boumediene remains at 
Guantanamo.9  Three of the five Algerian men were sent back to Bosnia, 
and even though Boumediene has been “freed,” the U.S. government 
does not yet know where to send him because Bosnia will not readmit 
him to the country.10 
Boumediene’s story illustrates the danger that Justice Stevens was 
pointing to in the above-cited quote: without habeas corpus, U.S. 
detention policy in the war on terror devolves into tyranny, holding 
prisoners without justification for years on end.  The executive branch 
has detained prisoners at Guantanamo since shortly after 9/11 without 
meaningful review from the judicial branch of the U.S. government.11  
The landmark Supreme Court case, Boumediene v. Bush, decided on 
June 12, 2008, held that the writ of habeas corpus applied 
extraterritorially to the detainees held at Guantanamo.12  Some have 
called the decision a judicial victory that gives freedom to the enemy in a 
way that will most certainly cause more American lives to be lost.13  
Judical victory or not, it remains clear that the true “victor”—
Boumediene—has yet to receive his spoils. 
Considering the holding of Boumediene in the narrow context of 
Lakhdar Boumediene’s story, the Court’s decision seemed to concern 
individual rights, in particular a detainee’s right to assert the writ of 
habeas corpus.  On the other hand, Justice Stevens’s remarks suggest 
another lens through which the holding might be viewed: one of 
separation of powers.  Justice Stevens properly recognized that our 
democracy is negatively affected if the Executive has unrestricted power 
to imprison; therefore, the writ must serve as a check upon that power.  
The Boumediene decision reflected elements of both of these viewpoints, 
                                                                                                                       
2008, at A2; Carol J. Williams, U.S. Releases 3 Detainees to Bosnia, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at 
A13. 
 8. Terry Frieden, Federal Judge Orders Release of 5 Guantanamo Detainees, CNN.com, Nov. 
20, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/20/gitmo.detainees/; Judge Orders Guantanamo 
Releases, ALJAZEERA.NET, Nov. 21, 2008, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2008/11/ 
2008112017273323533.html. 
 9. Finn, supra note 7.  As of the time this article was written—March 14th, 2009—
Boumediene was still being held at Guantanamo Bay.  David G. Savage, They Are ‘Enemy 
Combatants’ No More; The Administration Abandons the Term and Curbs Executive Power, L.A. 
TIMES, March 14, 2009, at A16. 
 10. Finn, supra note 7. 
 11. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2279 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 12. Id. at 2262 (majority opinion). 
 13. See id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The game of bait-and-switch that today’s opinion 
plays upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us.  It will almost 
certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”). 
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as the Court addressed a problem in terms of separation of powers, yet 
delivered a solution focused on individual rights.  The Court recognized 
the danger of an executive with limitless power to detain, yet delivered a 
very narrow restraint on that power.  The Court held that the detainees at 
Guantanamo may challenge their detention using the writ of habeas 
corpus; but the holding was limited specifically to those Guantanamo 
detainees.  The true inadequacy of this opinion remains to be seen as 
President Obama signed an executive order on January 22, 2009, 
pledging to close Guantanamo within a year.14  If transferred to a 
different location outside the United States, the issue of habeas and this 
group of detainees may rise again. 
This Comment will demonstrate that, given the nature of the writ of 
habeas corpus, individual rights and separation of powers are 
intertwined; therefore, a holding based upon the principles of one will 
inevitably be based on the principles of the other.  This intermingling of 
concepts provides an explanation of why the Court resorted to 
questionable interpretations of century-old precedent to reach a 
prescription ill-fitting of the stated problem.  The Court is uncomfortable 
with a holding that rings of extending “fundamental rights” to detainees; 
therefore, it stopped short of doing so by employing an awkward 
“practicality” test.  It remains to be seen how effectively this decision 
will aid the detainees in Guantanamo, but it will certainly not aid 
detainees held by the Executive outside of Guantanamo.  This Comment 
argues that the disfavored idea of extending fundamental rights led the 
Court to provide a timid and inadequate prescription to the separation of 
powers problem.  Moreover, the proper solution appears when 
individual-rights concerns do not overshadow the analysis.  The 
Executive’s power to detain is necessarily limited by judicial review in 
the form of habeas corpus, and this separation of power is only truly 
achieved when the judiciary can review every detention made by the 
Executive, regardless of time, place, or person.  Any solution that falls 
short of that erodes the principles of democracy. 
This Comment begins with background information regarding the 
legislative reaction to the “war on terror cases,” the foundations of the 
writ of habeas corpus, and the precedent dealing with extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution.  It then analyzes the Court’s use of 
precedent, and offers a theory as to why the Court may have employed 
questionable interpretation of that precedent.  The Comment argues that 
                                                          
 14. Scott Shane, Obama Orders Secret Prisons and Detention Camps Closed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/us/politics/23GITMOCND.html. 
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this flawed interpretation of precedent resulted in an inadequate solution 
to the problem noted by the Court, and it addresses major counter 
arguments to this position.  Finally, it explains why allowing every 
executive detention to be challenged using the writ of habeas corpus will 
restore the proper balance of power between the executive and judicial 
branches. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Guantanamo Bay: The Battle to Maintain a “Legal Black Hole” 
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
Executive rapidly began capturing detainees abroad and transporting 
them to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.15  It has been suggested by many 
scholars that the Executive chose Guantanamo as a detention location to 
create a zone where no laws would apply, shielding the detention and 
related occurrences from any sort of legal review.16  The Executive 
derived this particular understanding of the law from Johnson v. 
Eisentrager,17 as evidenced by its stringent reliance on that case.18  
Eisentrager was commonly interpreted as holding that the Constitution 
only applied in areas where America exercised formal sovereignty.19  
The Executive held prisoners in Guantanamo under the power granted by 
                                                          
 15. See A. Wallace Tashima, The War on Terror and the Rule of Law, 15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 245, 
248–49 (2008) (“Amidst the subsequent fighting in Afghanistan in late 2001, hundreds of suspected 
Taliban and al Qaeda associates were captured by U.S. military forces or handed over to U.S. forces 
by anti-Taliban Afghan allies.  By January 2002, twenty such detainees had been transported to 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, and by February 2002, 300 were being held at 
Guantanamo.”). 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 262 (“It is now clear that the Administration’s placement of its detainee 
prison at Guantanamo Bay was based on the notion that, in virtue of Cuba’s residual sovereignty 
over that site, the writ of habeas corpus would not apply there.”); see also Robert Knowles & Marc 
D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited-Government Theory of Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 637, 642–43 (2006–2007) (“The U.S. government holds non-citizens in overseas 
prisons and in Guantánamo precisely because it believes that these are places in the world where the 
government is accountable at law to no person or judge.”). 
 17. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 18. Marcia Coyle, High Court Justices to Review Detainees’ Rights Under Habeas Corpus: 
Court to Weigh Whether Military Commissions Act Unconstitutionally Bars Access to the Writ, THE 
NAT’L L.J., Dec. 4, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1196676275178. 
 19. See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1013, 1049–50 (2008) (“In July 2002, the district court [in Rasul v. Bush] dismissed the cases 
for lack of jurisdiction, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager to 
conclude that ‘aliens detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States [may not] invok[e] 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.’” (quoting Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 
2002), aff’d sub nom, Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 466 
(2004))). 
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the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) and began conducting 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to determine whether the 
persons detained at Guantanamo were “enemy combatants” such that 
they “could be detained for the duration of the ‘war on terror.’”20 
In 2004, the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush that the federal 
habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provided habeas relief to the 
Guantanamo detainees,21 hinting in its opinion that the detainees may 
have a constitutional habeas right as well.22  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to hear the first habeas petition filed by a Guantanamo detainee 
and, in response, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
(DTA) to remove jurisdiction of federal courts to hear habeas petitions 
filed by aliens held in Guantanamo.23  In 2006, the Supreme Court in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld24 interpreted the DTA to be non-retroactive, such 
that the Supreme Court could hear the habeas petitions made prior to 
enactment of the statute.25  In response to Hamdan, Congress enacted the 
Military Commissions Act (MCA), which removed federal jurisdiction 
over all petitions, pending and future, filed by the Guantanamo 
detainees.26  Finally, in Boumediene, the Court invalidated the section of 
the MCA that blocked jurisdiction over the claims of detainees, holding 
it a violation of their constitutional right to petition for habeas corpus.27 
This exchange between the three branches of government played out 
over the course of four years, and displayed the Executive’s 
determination to keep Guantanamo detainees out of federal courts.  
Months after the Boumediene decision, the courts were still determining 
what rules would govern the habeas process,28 and the Executive still 
held prisoners in places outside of Guantanamo, where detainees’ rights 
remained even more uncertain.29 
                                                          
 20. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH: GUANTANAMO DETAINEES’ RIGHT TO 
HABEAS CORPUS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 1 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/natsec/RL34536.pdf. 
 21. Id. at 2. 
 22. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004). 
 23. GARCIA, supra note 20, at 2. 
 24. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 25. GARCIA, supra note 20, at 2. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). 
 28. Editorial, Detainees’ Day in Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2008, at A18. 
 29. See Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 16, at 640 (stating that the United States has detainees 
“in U.S. detention centers in Afghanistan and Iraq, and even in the CIA ‘black sites’ where high-
value detainees have been kept incommunicado in undisclosed locations”). 
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B. Foundations of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
The writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed in the Constitution at Article 
1, Section 9, and states: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
the public Safety may require it.”30  The fact that this is one of the few 
individual rights guaranteed in the Constitution, which at the time had no 
Bill of Rights amended to it, suggests the writ’s importance to the idea of 
a free society.31 
After reviewing the historical origin of the writ, the Court in 
Boumediene concluded that its original scope was indeterminable and 
therefore not helpful in deciding whether the writ applied to the detainees 
of Guantanamo.32  Although not dispositive in the eyes of the Court, the 
two historical interpretations of the purpose of the writ are important to 
note because they still play a role in the current debate over the proper 
scope of habeas.  Also, these two competing purposes help explain the 
inadequacy of the Court’s opinion in Boumediene as the focus on 
individual rights pushed the Court to leave executive power largely 
unchecked. 
On the one hand, there is a great amount of historical support that the 
writ was intended to confer an individual right.  The Court itself noted in 
Boumediene that the writ developed as a means of enforcing the Magna 
Carta’s decree “that no man would be imprisoned contrary to the law of 
the land.”33  Indeed, Blackstone referred to it as the “stable bulwark of 
our liberties.”34  A historical account, repeatedly cited by the 
Boumediene Court, noted that the writ provided “‘the right of the subject 
to be so delivered’” before the court to determine the legality of 
detention.35 
There is also an equal amount of historical evidence that the writ was 
focused more upon ensuring a proper separation of governmental 
powers, rather than conferring an individual right.  For instance, the 
Boumediene Court noted that in the 1600s, the writ became a device for 
                                                          
 30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 31. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244. 
 32. Id. at 2251. 
 33. Id. at 2244 (citing the MAGNA CARTA, Art. 39, in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 17 (Richard 
Perry & John Cooper eds., 1959)). 
 34. Id. at 2246 (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *137 
(1769)). 
 35. Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial 
Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 594 (2008) (citation omitted). 
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restraining the King’s power rather than adding to it.36  This idea was 
reiterated by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers when he 
noted “the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the 
favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny.”37  The Court also 
noted that the writ has been central to the idea of separation of powers, 
which in turn is the “surest safeguard” of liberty.38  Furthermore, it has 
been argued that the writ in England was a method of correcting any 
“‘manner of misgovernment.’”39 
It is important to note the dichotomy between the conferral of 
individual rights and the restraint on the King’s power that has existed 
throughout the history of the writ.  The Court’s opinion in Boumediene is 
itself an example of the dichotomy between these two ideas, often 
referring to the separation of powers issue, yet conferring upon the 
detainees a constitutional right to petition for habeas.  As will be 
addressed later, these two concepts are often offered as separate 
justifications for either extending or limiting the scope of habeas, but 
trying to consider the ideas separately is an exercise in futility, as the 
concept of habeas centers around both. 
C. Milestones in Case Law from the Last Century 
Case law regarding extraterritorial application of the Constitution 
bears directly on the scope of the writ, given that the writ is found within 
the Constitution.  The Court addressed the issue of extraterritorial scope 
at three major times in the last century.  In Boumediene, the Court relied 
on turn-of-the-century case law to overrule the bright line test for 
extraterritorial scope that was largely accepted as good law during the 
past fifty years.  These early twentieth century decisions, known as the 
“Insular Cases,” informed the Boumediene Court’s decision.40  Strangely 
enough, they also influenced the mid-century cases that produced the 
bright-line-sovereignty test.  A careful examination of the evolution of 
this body of law reveals that neither approach is quite in line with the 
precedent of the Insular Cases. 
                                                          
 36. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2245 (citing Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts—
Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REV. 335, 336 (1952)). 
 37. Id. at 2247 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 38. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)). 
 39. Halliday & White, supra note 35, at 608 (quoting Sir Edward Coke, 4 INSTITUTES OF THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 71 (1644)). 
 40. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255. 
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1. The Insular Cases: Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution in 
the Context of American Colonialism 
The Insular Cases guided the Boumediene Court’s opinion, yet their 
holdings do not seem so clearly in favor of the “practicality” test the 
Court ultimately formulated.  The name coined for these cases is a 
reference to the early twentieth-century American landscape, when 
America was left with several remote insular territories and was 
determined “to become a great colonial power on the European model.”41  
Much constitutional case law developed from the fact that imperialists 
desired to rule over their territories without constitutional constraint, 
citizenship for the people, or cultural integration with the United States.42 
a. Downes v. Bidwell: The Emergence of Fundamental Rights 
Downes was one of the earliest cases that considered extraterritorial 
application of constitutional rights, and introduced the idea of a 
fundamental right, but ultimately concluded Congress should decide 
where constitutional rights extend.43  In Downes, which was the first of 
the cases to reach the Supreme Court, the Court held that “the 
Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest 
only when and so far as Congress shall so direct.”44  The issue in Downes 
was whether the territory of Puerto Rico was part of the United States 
such that it was not “foreign,” and therefore imports would not be subject 
to taxation.45  The Court’s decision did not rest completely on practical 
concerns, but did briefly consider the difficulties of applying the 
constitution and thus taxing the subjects of Puerto Rico.46  The Court 
noted that imposing a tax burden so much greater than what the people of 
Puerto Rico were accustomed to would bring “violations of the law so 
innumerable as to make prosecutions impossible.”47  The Court 
ultimately concluded that because territories were often “inhabited by 
alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of 
taxation, and modes of thought, the administration of government and  
 
                                                          
 41. Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004). 
 42. Id. at 9. 
 43. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 283 (1901). 
 44. Id. at 279. 
 45. Id. at 247–48. 
 46. Id. at 283–84. 
 47. Id. at 284. 
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justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be 
impossible.”48 
The Court began hinting at another one of the themes of the Insular 
Cases: that there are certain rights that all individuals possess regardless 
of whether the Constitution might apply to them.49  However, the Court 
did not decide this issue, implying that the right to be taxed by a 
government does not fall within this category of fundamental rights, 
seemingly because it would not be practical to tax the people of Puerto 
Rico.50  The Court ultimately conceded that Congress must be entrusted 
with the power to make decisions regarding the extension of rights.51 
b. Balzac v. Porto Rico: Practicality as a Method of Statutory 
Interpretation 
In Balzac, the Court picked up on the idea that certain rights were 
fundamental.52  This case becomes particularly important in analyzing 
the Court’s latest decision in Boumediene, because as the Boumediene 
Court stated, this “century-old doctrine informs our analysis in the 
present matter.”53  In Balzac, the defendant was charged with two counts 
of libel and demanded a jury trial, the issue in the case being whether the 
Constitution guaranteed the defendant such a jury.54  The defendant 
argued that, among other laws, § 5 of the Jones Act, providing Puerto 
Ricans with the option of becoming a U.S. citizen, implied Congress’s 
intent to incorporate the territory.55  In deciding the issue, the Balzac 
Court expanded the practical approach briefly touched on in Downes, 
noting the “inherent practical difficulties of enforcing all constitutional 
provisions ‘always and everywhere.’”56  The Court first made it utterly 
clear that the majority opinion by Justice White in Downes v. Bidwell has 
“become the settled law of the court,” stating: 
 
                                                          
 48. Id. at 287. 
 49. See id. at 282 (“We suggest, without intending to decide, that there may be a distinction 
between certain natural rights enforced in the Constitution by prohibitions against interference with 
them, and what may be termed artificial or remedial rights . . . .”). 
 50. See id. at 283–84 (noting first the difference between natural and remedial rights, then 
moving into a discussion of the practicality of taxing the subjects of Puerto Rico). 
 51. Id. at 283. 
 52. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922). 
 53. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2255 (2008). 
 54. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 300, 304. 
 55. Id. at 306–07. 
 56. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2254–55 (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312). 
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 We conclude that the power to govern territory, implied in the right 
to acquire it, and given to Congress in the Constitution in article 4, § 3, 
to whatever other limitations it may be subject, the extent of which 
must be decided as questions arise, does not require that body to enact 
for ceded territory, not made part of the United States by Congressional 
action, a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, 
and that the Constitution does not, without legislation and of its own 
force, carry such right to territory so situated.57 
The Court further acknowledged that when Congress makes a law that 
confers political or civil rights on inhabitants of new lands, this law “may 
be properly interpreted to mean an incorporation” of the new land into 
the United States.58  The Court did proceed through an analysis of 
whether it would be practical to extend the right to jury trial, citing 
problems such as training jury members and developing “a conscious 
duty of participation in the machinery of justice.”59  However, this 
practical analysis was contingent on the fact there was an underlying 
statute; it was used essentially as a method of statutory interpretation to 
determine whether Congress meant to incorporate Puerto Rico.60  
Therefore, the practical analysis was not undertaken of its own accord to 
decide whether or not the Constitution, and therefore the right to trial by 
jury, should apply.  Without an underlying statute, there could be no 
incorporation, and therefore the Constitution could not apply to that 
territory.  As the Court put it, “[t]he question before us, therefore, is: Has 
Congress . . . enacted legislation incorporating Porto Rico [sic] into the 
Union?”61  Balzac seems more consistent with the bright-line sovereignty 
test seen later in Eisentrager, as opposed to the “practicality” test the 
Boumediene Court somehow gleaned from this case. 
Ultimately, the Insular Cases and the doctrine they advocated were 
heavily criticized as being “frank racism”62 and “contrary to American 
territorial practice and experience.”63  Despite the great amount of 
criticism and the seemingly inevitable invalidation of the line of 
                                                          
 57. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305 (quoting Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904)). 
 58. Id. at 309. 
 59. Id. at 309–10. 
 60. See id. at 309 (“It is true that in the absence of other and countervailing evidence, a law of 
Congress or a provision in a treaty acquiring territory, declaring an intention to confer political and 
civil rights on the inhabitants of the new lands as American citizens, may be properly interpreted to 
mean an incorporation of it into the Union . . . .”). 
 61. Id. at 305. 
 62. Neuman, supra note 41, at 11. 
 63. Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political 
Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 283, 286 (2007). 
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reasoning found within these cases,64 the doctrine was kept alive, albeit 
in a skewed manner, by the next milestone cases, occurring nearly 50 
years later in Johnson v. Eisentrager 65 and Reid v. Covert.66 
2. Eisentrager: Sovereignty Versus Practicality 
Eisentrager marks the appearance of the bright-line sovereignty test 
for extraterritorial application of the Constitution.  In Eisentrager, the 
Court for the first time had to determine whether constitutional rights 
applied to a group of individuals who not only are not citizens of the 
United States, but have been deemed its enemy.67  Here, twenty-one 
German nationals filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the District 
Court for the District of Columbia.68  The prisoners were convicted of 
violating the laws of war and were being held under the custody of an 
American army officer in Landsberg Prison in Germany.69  The 
proceeding that convicted these prisoners was held “wholly under 
American auspices and involved no international participation.”70  In an 
opinion that some have referred to as “opaque,”71 the Court held that the 
petitioner enemy-aliens do not have the right to assert the writ of habeas 
corpus.72  However, the Court did not explicitly clarify its reasoning 
behind the holding.  In denying the prisoners a constitutional right to 
assert the writ of habeas, the court focused upon three factors: (1) the 
prisoners were never on sovereign U.S. territory, (2) it was not practical 
to allow the prisoners this right, and (3) it was not in the best interest of 
America or its soldiers to allow the prisoners this right.73 
The Court found it important that the prisoners were never on 
sovereign U.S. territory because, in the past, the “privilege of litigation 
ha[d] been extended to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because 
permitting their presence in the country implied protection.”74  The Court 
stated that no such implication arose for the prisoners in Eisentrager 
                                                          
 64. Neuman, supra note 41, at 11–12. 
 65. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 66. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 67. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766. 
 68. Id. at 765. 
 69. Id. at 766. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, 
and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2055 (2007). 
 72. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 781. 
 73. Id. at 777–79. 
 74. Id. at 777–78. 
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because “at no relevant time were [the prisoners] within any territory 
over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their 
offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond 
the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.”75  Because 
the Court considered other factors in addition to this sovereignty 
concern, it is difficult to argue that sovereignty is the sole test for 
whether constitutional rights extend; however, it was clearly important to 
the Eisentrager Court.  In his dissent, Justice Black stated that if 
sovereignty was to be the deciding factor of whether constitutional rights 
apply extraterritorially, “the Court is adopting a broad and dangerous 
principle.”76  Black also recognized that the approach would permit the 
executive branch to deprive courts of their power to stop illegal 
incarcerations simply by “deciding where its prisoners will be tried and 
imprisoned.”77 
The Court also discussed the practical impediments to allowing the 
prisoners to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, such as the difficulty in 
transporting the prisoners overseas for the hearing, which would require 
“allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and 
rations.”78  The Court stated the transportation of witnesses and legal 
counsel would be a hindrance as well.79  The Court did not cite to any of 
the Insular Cases—or any other precedent—for the proposition that 
practical analysis was appropriate even in the absence of a statute that 
might be interpreted to mean incorporation.80 
The Court also stated that extending the writ’s scope to such 
prisoners would be a poor strategic choice.  The Court reasoned that 
allowing such habeas trials would aid and comfort the enemy, diminish 
the prestige of commanders, and divert the attention of officers called to 
testify in the United States.81  Lastly, the United States could expect no 
reciprocity for American soldiers detained by other countries.82 
Again, the practical analysis factored into the Court’s decision; but 
coupled with the language focusing on sovereignty, one cannot be certain 
what test comes out of Eisentrager.83  Although the Court this time did 
                                                          
 75. Id. at 778. 
 76. Id. at 795 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 778–79 (majority opinion). 
 79. Id. at 779. 
 80. See id. (proceeding through the practical analysis without citing to any authority). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 71, at 2055 (stating that the Court’s opinion was 
“opaque” and suggesting several alternative interpretations). 
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not cite to any of the Insular Cases as a basis for the practical analysis 
undertaken, the next time the Court saw this issue, seven years later, a 
concurrence by Justice Harlan would reaffirm where the practicality 
concerns originated. 
3. Reid v. Covert: The Practicality Test Reappears 
Reid involved two military wives who had killed their husbands 
while abroad in England.84  The military convicted the two by tribunal 
and the women petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which the court 
ultimately granted.85  Again, Reid addressed whether or not the 
Constitution applied abroad, specifically in England and Japan, where 
the respective women were stationed with their husbands.86  Justice 
Black, writing for the plurality, overtly expressed his disdain for the 
practicality test derived from the Insular cases: 
Moreover, it is our judgment that neither the cases nor their reasoning 
should be given any further expansion.  The concept that the Bill of 
Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government 
are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency 
dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to 
flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and 
undermine the basis of our government.87 
Justice Black went on, saying “we have no authority, or inclination, to 
read exceptions into [the Constitution] which are not there.”88  In 
distinguishing the situation at hand from the Insular Cases, Justice Black 
determined that here, constitutional protections applied because the 
women were American citizens, not because of Congress’s Article IV 
power to rule temporarily over “territories with wholly dissimilar 
traditions and institutions.”89  In fact, the opinion did not rely on practical 
concerns whatsoever in extending the writ.90 
 
 
                                                          
 84. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1957). 
 85. Id. at 5. 
 86. Id. at 3–5. 
 87. Id. at 14. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  Article IV of the Constitution, Section 3, reads: “The Congress shall have Power to 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.   
 90. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5–6 (failing to discuss any practical concerns). 
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Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan each wrote an opinion 
concurring in the judgment.91  Justice Frankfurter did not consider 
practical factors in deciding whether the Constitution should extend; he 
employed the test in the context of In re Ross,92 to “harmoniz[e]” 
conflicting constitutional provisions.93  In summary, although Justice 
Frankfurter touched on practical analysis, it was not to decide the issue 
of whether the Constitution applied extraterritorially.  However, Justice 
Harlan suggested that practicality was the proper test for deciding 
whether the Constitution would apply extraterritorially, and marked the 
first time a Justice took such a position.94 
Justice Harlan first picked up on the idea touched on by the Court in 
Balzac that some rights apply always and everywhere, regardless of the 
Constitution.  While he did not state it explicitly, Justice Harlan implied 
such rights exist when he stated “there are provisions in the Constitution 
which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign 
place.”95  This suggests there are other provisions that do.  Citing the 
Balzac case in particular, Justice Harlan noted that consideration of 
whether application of a constitutional right would be “impracticable and 
anomalous,” as well as considerations of “the particular local setting, the 
practical necessities, and the possible alternatives,” were all relevant to 
the question of “which guarantees of the Constitution should apply.”96  In 
other words, the particular circumstances determine which rights do not 
necessarily apply in all circumstances.97  The issue of extraterritorial 
scope of rights would not concern the Court again until nearly another 
half-century, in a post 9/11 America, when the United States began 
detaining suspected terrorists at the Naval base in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba. 
                                                          
 91. Id. at 41 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
result). 
 92. See 140 U.S. 453, 479 (1891) (holding that a prisoner aboard an American vessel in 1891, 
harbored in a port of Japan, was subject to a consular tribunal there, based on the power of a treaty 
between the United States and Japan). 
 93. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 54–64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (stating that in the 
context of inferior laws of eastern civilization at the time of the Ross case, it was necessary to make 
treaties employing consular tribunals to guarantee citizens of Christian countries were treated fairly). 
 94. Id. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). 
 95. Id. at 74 (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. at 74–75 (emphasis added). 
 97. See id. at 75 (“In other words, what Ross and the Insular Cases hold is that the particular 
local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives are relevant to a question of 
judgment, namely, whether jury trial should be deemed a necessary condition of the exercise of 
Congress’ power to provide for the trial of Americans overseas.” (emphasis added)). 
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4. Rasul v. Bush: A Foreshadowing of Constitutional Rights 
Rasul involved two Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens 
who were captured abroad and taken to Guantanamo Bay in early 2002.98  
The District Court that first heard the petition relied on Eisentrager to 
hold that “‘aliens detained outside the sovereign territory of the United 
States [may not] invok[e] a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.’”99  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, again citing Eisentrager, holding 
that “‘the privilege of litigation’ does not extend to aliens in military 
custody who have no presence in ‘any territory over which the United 
States is sovereign.’”100  The Supreme Court determined there was 
statutory jurisdiction for the writ of habeas corpus to apply to the 
prisoners, and that there was no need to reach the constitutional issue.101 
More importantly, the Court suggested that extending the right of 
habeas corpus to the prisoners in Guantanamo was “consistent with the 
historical reach of the writ.”102  The Court noted that the writ of habeas 
corpus traditionally ran wherever the King’s restraint was inflicted, 
because the King was “[e]ntitled to have an account” of why his subject 
was restrained.103  The application of the writ “depended not on formal 
notions of territorial sovereignty, but rather on the practical question of 
‘the exact extent and nature of the jurisdiction or dominion exercised in 
fact by the Crown.’”104 
5. Boumediene v. Bush: The Reid “Practicality” Test Finds Support in 
the Majority 
Boumediene again involved prisoners at Guantanamo Bay; however, 
because the DTA had modified 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to remove statutory 
jurisdiction,105 it addressed whether a constitutional privilege of habeas 
corpus extended to the prisoners, “a privilege not to be withdrawn except 
in conformance with the Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.”106  
                                                          
 98. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470–71 (2004). 
 99. Id. at 472 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d sub nom, Al 
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)). 
 100. Id. at 473 (quoting Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1144). 
 101. Id. at 483–85. 
 102. Id. at 481. 
 103. Id. at 482 n.13 (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 131 
(1769)). 
 104. Id. at 482 (quoting Ex parte Mwenya, (1960) 1 Q.B. 241, 303). 
 105. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 71, at 2060. 
 106. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008). 
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Ultimately, the Court held that the prisoners did have a constitutional 
right to habeas corpus; therefore, the Court struck down the MCA’s 
provision removing the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear petitions 
from enemy aliens.107 
The Court analyzed the historical foundations of the writ, including 
the traditional common-law scope of its application, citing as examples 
various cases where the writ was or was not applied to “territories” of 
Britain.108  In the end, the Court determined that the historical scope of 
the writ was not conclusive, and therefore not dispositive of the 
constitutional issue.109 
The Court then discussed the American precedent, starting with the 
Insular Cases.  The Court stated that these cases stand for the proposition 
that “the Constitution has independent force in these territories, a force 
not contingent upon acts of legislative grace.”110  The Court cited Balzac 
for the proposition that “certain fundamental personal rights declared in 
the Constitution” applied to even non-citizen inhabitants of 
unincorporated territories.111  More importantly, the Court declared that 
the 100-year-old doctrine from Balzac “informs [the] analysis in the 
present matter.”112 
The Court highlighted the concurrence from the Reid opinion, 
focusing on the rejection of a “‘rigid and abstract rule,’” and noted that 
the circumstances for each particular case must be taken into account, 
and enforcement of the Constitution must not be “‘impracticable and 
anomalous.’”113  The Court also highlighted the portion of Eisentrager 
focusing on the practical concerns of affording the German prisoners the 
right to petition for habeas relief.114  The Court described the common 
thread running through all the relevant precedent as “the idea that 
questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical 
concerns, not formalism.”115  It then held inconclusive the portion of 
                                                          
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at 2245–51 (outlining the history of the writ, starting with its application in England 
as to powers of the King, noting historical support for both parties’ arguments).  Ultimately the 
Court concluded that a “[d]iligent search by all parties reveals no certain conclusions.”  Id. at 2248.  
The Court declined “to infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence on 
point.”  Id. at 2251. 
 109. Id. at 2251. 
 110. Id. at 2254. 
 111. Id. at 2255 (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 2255–56 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
result)). 
 114. Id. at 2257. 
 115. Id. at 2258–59. 
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Eisentrager that suggested the test for determining extension of the writ 
should be formal sovereignty.116  The Court stated: “the writ of habeas 
corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the 
separation of powers.  The test for determining the scope of this 
provision must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is 
designed to restrain.”117  The Court then laid down a three-prong test for 
determining extraterritorial application of the writ: “(1) the citizenship 
and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which 
that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where 
apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical 
obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”118 
In applying the first prong of the test, the Court largely compared the 
Guantanamo detainees to the prisoners of Landsberg from Eisentrager.  
The Court noted that, like the Landsberg prisoners, the prisoners before it 
were not American citizens.119  Contrastingly, the prisoners in 
Boumediene had not accepted their status as enemy-combatants, unlike 
the prisoners from Eisentrager, who conceded their status.120  However, 
the crux of this prong of the test focused on the adequacy of the process 
through which status determinations were made.121  The Court took great 
care in noting the inadequacies of the Combat Status Review Tribunals 
as compared with the system employed to try the Landsberg prisoners, 
specifically noting the lack of a “rigorous adversarial process” and the 
limited ability to rebut evidence.122 
The Court’s application of the second prong, the nature of the site of 
apprehension and detention, again focused on a comparison between 
Guantanamo and Landsberg.  Among the critical differences was the fact 
that the United States shared control over Landsberg with the other 
Allied forces whereas Guantanamo was in the “constant jurisdiction of 
the United States.”123  In that same vein, the United States did not solely 
conduct the tribunals convicting the prisoners in Landsberg; instead, it 
was an Allied effort, whereas Guantanamo is the sole effort of the United  
 
                                                          
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2259; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 795 (1950) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (stating that such a test for extension of the writ was dangerous). 
 118. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 2259–60. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 2260–61. 
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States.124  The Court disregarded the rigid absolute sovereignty test from 
Eisentrager.125 
The Court noted that the third prong, the practical obstacles to 
extending the writ, was not dispositive.126  Relevant to this conclusion 
was the fact that “[c]ompliance with any judicial process requires some 
incremental expenditure of resources,” and furthermore, the government 
presented “no credible arguments that the military mission at 
Guantanamo would be compromised” if Guantanamo prisoners were 
allowed to assert the writ.127  Although not dispositive in this case, the 
Court did imply that practical concerns were dispositive in Eisentrager, 
noting the large population the military controlled in post-war Germany 
and the “massive reconstruction” efforts undertaken.128  The Court also 
stated that adjudicating a habeas petition would not cause any “friction” 
with the government of Cuba.129  Ultimately, the Court concluded that, in 
the case of Guantanamo, “to the extent [practical] barriers arise, habeas 
corpus procedures likely can be modified to address them.”130  Based on 
its application of the three factors, the Court held that the constitutional 
right to petition for a writ of habeas has “full effect at Guantanamo 
Bay.”131 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Court’s decisions in the “war on terror” cases have brought to 
light two competing viewpoints regarding extraterritorial application of 
the Constitution.  On one hand is the argument that focuses on 
government action, suggesting that separation of powers related 
restraints should apply to those actions, always and everywhere.132  On 
the other hand is the argument that focuses on individual rights.  The 
usual argument states the Court is not justified in naming itself the 
                                                          
 124. Id. at 2260. 
 125. Id. at 2260–61. 
 126. Id. at 2261. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 2262. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See, e.g., Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, The Ties That Bind: The Constitution, Structural 
Restraints, and Government Action Overseas, 96 GEO. L. J. 237, 248 (2007) (“If a provision exists to 
limit the range of permissible government activity, that activity does not become permissible simply 
because those affected live beyond our borders.”); Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 16, at 646 
(suggesting the proper analysis focuses not on individual rights, but instead “whether the 
Constitution has granted the government the particular power that it seeks to deploy”). 
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dictator of which fundamental rights shall apply to all civilized people, 
especially those located outside the United States; however, there are 
those that believe the Court is justified in taking the fundamental rights 
approach.133  The Boumediene Court struggled to reconcile this 
dichotomy, resulting in questionable interpretation of precedent and a 
failure to restore the separation of power. 
This Comment seeks to address two major concerns with the three-
prong test laid down in Boumediene.  First, the Court made a great leap 
in doctrine by recalling the Insular Cases.  The proposition that practical 
concerns should be controlling in deciding where the writ shall run 
allowed the Court to provide habeas petitions for Guantanamo detainees 
without having to decide whether a fundamental right to challenge 
detention exists.  Second, the new test does not solve the principal 
problem the Court sought to address: the imbalance in the separation of 
powers resulting from the Executive’s manipulation of the application of 
a judicial function designed to restrain executive power.134  As the 
analysis will demonstrate, the “practicality” test leaves the Executive 
great room to create more detention centers where effectively no law 
would apply— “legal black holes.”  This Comment offers a bright line 
solution to the two aforementioned problems: any person that the 
Executive branch detains, at any place and at any time, shall be able to 
assert the writ of habeas corpus, except when Congress has properly 
suspended the writ. 
A. The Insular Cases: A Questionable Interpretation with a Purpose 
1. A Different Interpretation of Precedent 
The Court in Boumediene stated that its analysis relied on the 
doctrine laid out in Balzac.135  However, a close examination of Balzac 
reveals that the Court borrowed an idea, instead of upholding a 
precedent.  The Boumediene Court selectively quoted from Balzac to 
                                                          
 133. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 24–25 (2008) (arguing the Court’s opinion had 
“less to do with separation-of-powers theory than with a commitment to protecting noncitizens 
overseas” and then criticizing this path as “novel[]”).  But cf. Elizabeth Sepper,  The Ties That Bind: 
How the Constitution Limits the CIA’s Actions in the War on Terror, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1805, 
1828–42 (2006) (arguing that the fundamental rights approach is the proper way to address indefinite 
executive detention, specifically citing the fundamental rights listed in the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments). 
 134. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. 
 135. See id. at 2255 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)) (noting that Balzac 
informed its analysis). 
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materialize the proposition that certain rights in the Constitution are not 
“always and everywhere” applicable, and practical concerns should 
dictate which rights apply to a given place.136  However, a closer 
examination of Balzac reveals practical concerns served no such purpose.  
Before embarking on its practical analysis, the Balzac Court clarified that 
the issue at hand was whether “Congress . . . enacted legislation 
incorporating Porto Rico [sic] into the Union”137 and that “incorporation 
is not to be assumed without express declaration, or an implication so 
strong as to exclude any other view.”138  The Court was only attempting 
to discern whether Congress had passed a law that could be properly 
interpreted to mean a territory had been incorporated into the Union.139  
Essentially, the Court used practical considerations as a method of 
statutory interpretation, asking if it made sense for a given statute to 
incorporate the territory in question and apply all constitutional rights to 
the people of that territory.140  Practical concerns were meaningless to the 
Balzac Court unless there was an underlying statute that might possibly 
be interpreted as providing for incorporation.  The practical analysis was 
not undertaken to see if the right to trial by jury should extend to the 
territory; rather, it was undertaken to see if there was implicit 
incorporation, thus extending the right by extending the reach of the 
Constitution.  This is important because under this method of analysis, 
the power still lies with Congress to extend rights; the Constitution 
would not extend without an underlying statute interpreted to grant 
incorporation.  Whether intentional or not, Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
in Reid usurped that power, implying that practical concerns should be 
evaluated regardless, with no mention of the necessity of an underlying 
incorporation statute. 
After the Balzac Court completed its discussion of implicit 
incorporation, it discussed the second motif of the Insular Cases: 
                                                          
 136. See id. (citing Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312) (summarizing Balzac as “noting the inherent 
practical difficulties of enforcing all constitutional provisions ‘always and everywhere’”). 
 137. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305. 
 138. Id. at 306. 
 139. See id. at 309 (“It is true, that in the absence of other and countervailing evidence, a law of 
Congress or a provision in a treaty acquiring territory, declaring an intention to confer political and 
civil rights on the inhabitants of the new lands as American citizens, may be properly interpreted to 
mean an incorporation of it into the Union . . . .”). 
 140. At the time, incorporation of a territory meant that the rights of the Constitution 
automatically applied.  See Neuman, supra note 41, at 6 (“At the turn of the last century, however, 
this settled understanding was overthrown by the Insular Cases, which adopted a new distinction 
between ‘incorporated territories’ and ‘unincorporated territories’ for the explicit purpose of 
facilitating colonial expansion.  The doctrine of the Insular Cases decreed that ‘nonfundamental’ 
constitutional limitations do not apply in unincorporated territories, although truly ‘fundamental’ 
constitutional limitations do apply.” (citations omitted)). 
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fundamental rights.  It was in this section of the opinion that the Court 
noted certain provisions of the Constitution do not apply “always and 
everywhere,” in order to distinguish between constitutional rights and 
fundamental rights.141  This was evidenced by the very next sentence 
when the Court stated, “[t]he guaranties [sic] of certain fundamental 
personal rights declared in the Constitution . . . had from the beginning 
full application in the [territories] . . . .”142  The Balzac Court was making 
the point that certain rights enumerated in the Constitution are 
fundamental, and apply always and everywhere, while others are not 
fundamental, and do not apply always and everywhere.  Nowhere in this 
section of Balzac did the Court state that practical concerns should 
determine which constitutional rights apply on a piece-meal basis.  One 
can see that a fundamental right would not be classified as such if its 
application depended on practicality.  Practical concerns were considered 
in Balzac only to determine whether the Constitution applies as a whole, 
through implicit incorporation, not to determine whether a particular 
right might extend.  When the Boumediene Court recanted Balzac, it 
fused these separate sections to come up with the idea that any given 
right in the Constitution may or may not extend based on practical 
considerations. 
As addressed in the next section, one can see why the Court favored 
its interpretation of precedent: if the power to extend the Constitution lay 
with Congress, the Court would have to declare the right to assert habeas 
using other means, for example, by declaring the right fundamental.  
However, if the Court focused on the separation of powers element, and 
the actions of the Executive, rather than the rights of individuals, it 
would have been justified in extending the writ, and in a manner less 
open to “judicial activism” criticism that the Court perhaps feared. 
The Boumediene Court failed to address Justice Black’s argument in 
Reid that rights should not be applied based on how practical it is to 
apply them, and therefore the Insular Cases should be limited to their 
current state and certainly not expanded.143  Instead, the Court focused on 
Justice Harlan’s idea that the Insular Cases “teach” that whether a 
constitutional provision has effect outside U.S. territory depends on the 
“particular circumstances” and the “practical necessities.”144  Although 
                                                          
 141. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312. 
 142. Id. at 312–13.  The Boumediene Court cited a portion of this quote shortly after it stated that 
the Constitution applies of its own force.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2253–54 
(2008). 
 143. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 144. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255 (citing Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1956) (Harlan, 
J., concurring in the result)). 
09.0_DAVIS FINAL 4/20/2009  4:59:38 PM 
1220 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
the Court certainly has the power to borrow concepts from prior cases 
and apply them in ways that fit with modern society, the Court here has 
slyly, or perhaps unknowingly, shifted the power to extend the 
extraterritorial scope away from Congress and toward the Court.  One 
could argue that the Court essentially was exerting the same power when 
interpreting the underlying statute in Balzac; however, under that system, 
the power to extend rights was more balanced because no rights were 
extended without an underlying statute, except for those rights that were 
fundamental.  Since this shift took place over the course of nearly one 
hundred years, one might also argue this is a natural change in 
jurisprudence.  However, considering the change was only truly made 
over the course of two opinions—the concurrence in Reid and now 
Boumediene—one could also argue it was abrupt. 
Lastly, the practical obstacles explored by the Court in Balzac seem 
to be of a different character than some of the practical obstacles 
mentioned by the Boumediene Court.  The Balzac opinion, as well as the 
other Insular Cases, dealt with applying Anglo-Saxon concepts of law to 
territories that perhaps had not traditionally embraced such concepts.  
For example, the Balzac Court noted the difficulty in teaching the policy 
behind jury participation to individuals that were not brought up in such 
a system.145  On the other hand, the Court in Boumediene considered the 
more procedural difficulties of conducting detention hearings for the writ 
of habeas corpus.146  One can see the difference between the more 
substance-based difficulty in forcing an entire population to learn a new 
philosophy on judicial participation as compared to such procedural 
difficulties; the latter certainly seeming more trivial.  The Court almost 
concedes the trivial nature of these practical concerns when it states that 
“[t]o the extent [such practical] barriers arise, habeas corpus procedures 
likely can be modified to address them.”147  Furthermore, it is doubtless 
there are practical obstacles to maintaining a prison anywhere outside of 
the United States, such as the difficulties in transporting prisoners to 
locations away from the battlefield; but that does not stop the Executive 
from doing so.  In other words, if the practical obstacles are not too great 
to detain an individual, it is unlikely they are too great to determine 
through a hearing if his imprisonment is just, whether it be at the prison 
                                                          
 145. See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 310 (“The jury system postulates a conscious duty of participation 
in the machinery of justice which it is hard for people not brought up in fundamentally popular 
government at once to acquire.”). 
 146. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260.  Although the Court made it clear it did not find such 
practical obstacles present, nor dispositive of the issue, it did consider them part of the test. 
 147. Id. at 2262. 
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itself, or somewhere else.  Not only did the Boumediene Court fail to 
apply practical concerns in the same context as Balzac, it arguably 
applied them in a less meaningful, more trivialized manner.  The next 
section offers a plausible explanation for the Court’s chosen 
interpretation of precedent. 
2. The Practicality Test Allows the Court to Avoid a Highly Criticized 
Body of Law 
Reaching back and glossing the Insular Cases with the principle that 
the Court’s duty is to apply practicality factors and determine whether 
the Constitution applies allowed the Court to avoid getting into a not-so-
favorable area of constitutional law: fundamental rights.  The reading of 
the Insular Cases, laid out in Part III.A.1, supra, suggests the power lies 
with Congress to control extraterritorial application of the Constitution.  
When the Court took up Boumediene, a federal law was in place, the 
Military Commissions Act, which stated the scope of extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution.  It said the Constitution did not apply to 
Guantanamo and the detainees kept there.148  If the Court did not 
interpret the precedent as it did, it would have been faced with the tough 
decision of either allowing executive detention to continue to go 
unchecked or extending the writ of habeas based on some other 
consideration—namely, that the detainees had a fundamental individual 
right to habeas corpus that attached whether or not the Constitution 
extended to Guantanamo. 
Many scholars have noted the Court’s propensity to avoid reaching 
the “headache” that comes with deciding cases on these types of 
fundamental rights arguments.149  The idea that fundamental rights were 
guaranteed by “substantive due process” is derived from the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and first appeared in Lochner v. New York.150  For a period 
after that decision, the Court expanded the contexts in which the doctrine 
                                                          
 148. Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 7(e)(1), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2007) 
(codified at 10 U.S.C.A. § 948 and 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241) (“No court, justice, or judge shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an 
alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been 
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 19, at 1064–65 (“The rights-based arguments in the ‘war on 
terror’ cases require resort to the sort of ‘fundamental due process’ arguments that drive academics 
back to uneasy contemplation of first philosophical principals. . . . In short, making the rights-based 
argument is a major academic headache.”). 
 150. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that citizens have a fundamental liberty interest in the freedom 
of contract), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). 
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applied.151  Since then, the idea of substantive due process rights has 
been continually limited, and “Lochnerizing” has been highly criticized 
as a version of judicial supremacy.152  Given the criticism of judicial 
creation of fundamental rights as applied to U.S. citizens, one can only 
imagine the judicial supremacy accusations that would ensue from 
applying this doctrine on the international level.  Even if the existence of 
such fundamental rights was generally accepted, it is possibly an even 
greater act of arrogance to assume the United States is responsible for 
declaring and enforcing them. 
There is an argument that both the Executive and the Court have 
used procedure to avoid resolving the merits of “war on terror” cases, to 
prevent squarely confronting such quandaries.153  The Court’s application 
of the three-prong test in Boumediene was not a procedural resolution in 
the sense that it reached the merits, as the Court held that Guantanamo 
detainees had the constitutional right to assert the writ.154  However, the 
Court did what many had predicted, failing to address “the broader 
question” of whether it is possible to deny this right to detainees located 
elsewhere.155  Quite possibly it was the Court’s hesitancy to extend such 
an individual right to all persons that led it to apply a practicality test and 
extend the Constitution only to Guantanamo.  Viewing the problem 
through this individual rights paradigm may have created another 
procedural step for detainees located in other U.S. prisons outside of 
Guantanamo, a preliminary hearing to apply the Boumediene test.  
Extending the constitutional right to assert the writ of habeas corpus was 
the correct outcome, but the Court’s method in reaching that conclusion 
was not properly focused.  The individual rights paradigm is what led the 
Court awry, and the understandably timid approach resulting from such a 
point of view prevented the Court from adequately addressing the  
 
 
                                                          
 151. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, Overcoming Lochner in the Twenty-First Century: Taking 
Both Rights and Popular Sovereignty Seriously as We Seek to Secure Equal Citizenship and Promote 
the Public Good, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 597, 599–600 (2008) (noting the consensus that something 
went wrong during the Lochner era, citing to a variety of sources). 
 152. See id. at 599 n.8. 
 153. Martinez, supra note 19, at 1071–72, 1074.  Martinez offers the example of the 
Government charging Jose Padilla with criminal charges before the Court could rule on the legality 
of his detention.  Id. at 1072.  Martinez also points out that judges often prefer to resolve on 
procedural grounds because no judge wants to overstep their bounds and “wake up tomorrow to a 
nuclear bomb in New York City.”  Id. at 1072. 
 154. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). 
 155. See Martinez, supra note 19, at 1075 (predicting “even in Boumediene the Court may again 
manage to dodge the broader question by focusing on the peculiar status of Guantanamo as a 
territory under complete U.S. control”). 
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problem it set out to solve: an imbalance in the separation of powers that 
favored the Executive.156 
B. Manipulation by the Executive: The Boumediene Test Fails to Solve 
the Problem 
Questionable interpretation of precedent aside, the central deficiency 
of the Court’s opinion in Boumediene is that it failed to truly restrain the 
Executive—the problem that the opinion itself purported was of serious 
concern.157  The unchecked power of the Executive has been evidenced 
by its manipulation of the holdings of Eisentrager, Rasul, and Hamdan, 
responding by either holding detainees in a particular place or pressing 
for passage of new legislation in response to the Court’s procedural 
rulings.158  The Court sought to address this problem, stating that habeas 
corpus itself is “an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the 
separation of powers” and therefore the scope “must not be subject to 
manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain.”159  The 
danger in abuse by the Executive is particularly magnified in the war on 
terror, where, among many factors, the unwillingness of the enemy to 
compromise makes the end of war much more difficult to attain.160  
Justice Black noted the problem of executive abuse in his dissent in 
Eisentrager,161 a dissent glossed over by the Boumediene Court.  Justice 
Scalia too noted the Executive’s propensity to manipulate the scope of 
habeas corpus in his dissent in Rasul, although he characterized it as the 
Executive’s right, stating the Executive should be able to rely on the 
Court’s opinions so that it may keep the court systems out of military 
affairs.162  After Eisentrager, the Executive attempted to take advantage 
of the bright-line rule regarding sovereignty by holding prisoners outside  
 
                                                          
 156. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See supra Part II.A. 
 159. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. 
 160. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Discusses 
Global War on Terror (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/2006/09/20060905-4.html (“In pursuit of their imperial aims, these extremists say 
there can be no compromise or dialogue with those they call ‘infidels’—a category that includes 
America . . . .”). 
 161. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 795 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 162. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Commander in Chief and his 
subordinates had every reason to expect that the internment of combatants at Guantanamo Bay 
would not have the consequence of bringing the cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts into 
military affairs.”). 
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of U.S. sovereign territory to prevent the writ from extending to such 
prisoners. 
The Boumediene Court frequently, and in the author’s opinion, 
correctly, phrases this problem as one of separation of powers.163  The 
Court mentioned fundamental rights when discussing some precedent,164 
but did not frame the problem to be solved in terms of a deficiency of 
individual rights extended to the detainees.  Curiously, the Court’s 
solution to its separation of powers problem was focused entirely on the 
practicality of extending individual rights, rather than the branches of 
government.165  It is this turn of analysis, caused by the “taboo” status of 
fundamental rights, which resulted in an inadequate solution.  Although 
the Court struck down sovereignty as the bright-line test and stated it will 
now only be a factor in the analysis,166 in the process it may have left the 
Executive with just as much room to manipulate because no prong of the 
test seems at all focused on separation of powers.167 
The third prong is the most offensive prong of the test, taking into 
account the practicality of extending the writ.  This portion of the test 
focuses on the individual, considering the “practical obstacles inherent in 
resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”168  In applying the 
prong, the Court cited “expenditure of funds” and “divert[ing] the 
attention of military personnel from other pressing tasks,” as important 
considerations.169  Even if the Court sought to resolve the individual 
rights issue, it does not seem a very strong argument to say that 
someone’s rights are lessened because enforcing them is impractical, or 
inconvenient.  There is no doubt that great inconvenience and expense 
are involved in the administration of justice throughout the United States, 
but it is generally accepted that the social cost of not having such an 
arrangement would be much greater.170  The Court seems to 
acknowledge this by noting this prong of the test is not dispositive,171 yet 
the fact it remains a prong suggests it must carry at least some weight.  
The Court also suggested that “to the extent [practical] barriers arise, 
                                                          
 163. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252, 2258 (stating the government’s position would be 
contrary to fundamental separation of powers principles). 
 164. See id. at 2255 (discussing the Insular Cases). 
 165. Id. at 2259. 
 166. Id. at 2258–59. 
 167. See id. (listing the relevant factors). 
 168. Id. (emphasis added). 
 169. Id. at 2261. 
 170. See Erwin Chemerinsky, When It Matters Most, It is Still the Kennedy Court, 11 GREEN 
BAG 2D 427, 434 (2008) (discussing the importance of due process protections). 
 171. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261. 
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habeas corpus procedures likely can be modified to address them,” 
further suggesting the unimportance of such considerations.172 
On the other hand, one could argue that this prong of the test 
becomes much more important in the context of the battlefield, and that 
this prong ensures that the judicial branch will not interfere with 
important military efforts.  This is no doubt a compelling interest, and 
some have suggested that if soldiers are to be concerned about the legal 
repercussions of their actions, such as the proper method of evidence 
collection, the result will be soldiers acting as crime scene 
investigators,173 and soldiers will inevitably be distracted from their 
duties.  However, the extension of the writ would not necessarily create 
such distractions.  The Boumediene Court referred to such minimal 
guarantees in status determinations as a right to counsel, and the right to 
rebut evidence.174  These types of guarantees would not require nor 
encourage soldiers to collect evidence in a manner on par with that of a 
crime scene investigator.  These guarantees only ensure that evidence 
suggesting the detainee’s status exists, rather than being shrouded in 
secrecy, and that the detainee has the assistance of counsel in 
understanding that evidence.  If no such evidence exists to hold a 
detainee, and the detainee is released, then it seems the writ has fulfilled 
its purpose: ensuring the legality of executive detention.  In that same 
vein, one might argue this prong protects against the transportation of 
detainees and their counsel overseas from impeding the military effort.  
However, this argument does not seem persuasive considering the 
military has been able to transport detainees overseas from Afghanistan 
to Cuba.175  It does not make sense to argue that moving prisoners across 
the globe to new detention facilities is not a great interference, while at 
the same time arguing that moving prisoners to provide a court hearing is 
a great interference. 
Based on this third prong, an executive branch that desires to keep 
“the cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts” out of military 
                                                          
 172. Id. at 2262. 
 173. See Mary L. Angell, U.S. Troops Honor Bound to Defend Rights of Guantanamo Bay 
Detainees, 31 WYO. LAW. (Aug. 2008) (citing Major Kyndra Rotunda’s June 20, 2008 Editorial in 
the Chicago Tribune, stating the Boumediene decision “is handicapping U.S. soldiers by ‘turning the 
battlefield into a crime scene investigation’”). 
 174. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260 (discussing the inadequacy of the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals). 
 175. See Names of the Detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, WASH. POST, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/guantanamo_names.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) 
(listing 367 prisoners held at Guantanamo whose names have been made public, most of whom were 
captured in Afghanistan). 
09.0_DAVIS FINAL 4/20/2009  4:59:38 PM 
1226 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
affairs176 now has an incentive to hold detainees in areas that would make 
extension of the writ impractical.  For instance, the Executive might 
decide to keep prisoners detained in an area far away, much farther away 
than ninety miles off the coast of Florida, thus creating too much a 
practical impediment for the writ to extend.  This line of analysis is not 
meant to suggest that the executive branch is filled with ill motives about 
how to keep prisoners from seeing federal courts; rather, it is meant to 
make the point that the implement designed to balance power becomes 
ineffective when the target of that implement has control over it.  When 
viewed through a separation of powers paradigm, this prong of the test 
seems to favor an increase in executive power by providing precedent 
that says the Executive need only place detainees in a country on the 
other side of the globe to control the scope of habeas review. 
The first prong of the test is also focused on the individual, taking 
into account the individual’s citizenship, the individual’s status, and the 
process afforded to determine that individual’s status.177  In one sense 
this prong seems to suggest the Executive has greater power to detain 
non-citizens, although the Court does not state it when applying the test; 
the precedent previously discussed by the Court clearly disfavors aliens 
not held in the United States.178  When examining this portion of the 
prong through the individual rights paradigm, the prong makes perfect 
sense: the protections of the Constitution are less likely to apply to an 
alien on foreign soil as compared to a citizen.  However, when analyzing 
the prong from the separation of powers viewpoint, it seems strange that 
the Executive is suddenly granted greater power to detain when acting 
against a non-citizen.  Also, the portion of the prong focused on the 
process given to the individual seems peculiar and somewhat out of place 
because the Court seems to be considering adequacy of process to 
determine whether they will hear a petition to decide adequacy of 
process.179  This second portion of the prong does not seem to augment 
executive power other than that perhaps it provides a double-layer of 
protection by twice considering adequate process as a substitute for 
actually allowing detainees access to federal courts. 
One could argue that granting the Executive this greater power to 
detain non-citizens is necessary in the war on terror, and removing such 
                                                          
 176. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 177. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. 
 178. Compare Eisentrager v. Johnson, 399 U.S. 763 (1950) (failing to extend the writ of habeas 
to aliens), with Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (extending the writ to citizens abroad). 
 179. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2273–75 (noting that the nature of the adversarial process to 
determine status is important, and then, after deciding the writ extends to the detainees, going on to 
consider whether the Executive had provided adequate adversarial process). 
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power will “almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed,”180 
presumably because the detainees who have been set free will then have 
the chance to perform terrorist acts, thus killing more Americans.  This 
argument has no force because (1) habeas petitions do not automatically 
ensure the release of a detainee,181 and (2) it assumes the guilt of the 
prisoners.  These assumptions of guilt are the exact danger that habeas 
petitions were meant to protect against.  As constitutional scholar Erwin 
Chemerinsky has pointed out, the criminal justice system provides a 
helpful analogy in responding to this argument: the release of suspected 
criminals or even charged criminals in the U.S. justice system could 
result in more deaths because criminals often re-offend, but the U.S. 
justice system does not resort to holding all suspected criminals 
indefinitely.182  There is value in providing a system that does not assume 
the guilt of all those accused of crimes, ensuring the innocent are not 
punished.  This value supersedes the risk of loss of life.  Even though 
there is real danger in released detainees committing terrorist acts,183 as 
Justice Stevens stated, the United States must not use tyranny to fight 
tyranny.184  The end of upholding the principles of democracy is lost if 
the United States sacrifices the principles of democracy in striving to 
achieve that end. 
In the second prong of the test, the territorial sovereignty aspect lives 
on, looking at the nature of the sites where apprehension and detention of 
the detainees took place.185  Therefore, the Executive still has the power 
to manipulate the test by holding detainees in prisons where the United 
States does not have absolute sovereignty.  In applying that prong of the 
test, the Court found it important that the prisoners from Eisentrager, 
held at Landsberg prison, were under the joint control of the U.S. and 
Allied Forces.186  Perhaps this will be an incentive for the Executive to 
hold prisoners under joint control with another nation.  Essentially, this 
prong of the test provides the Executive a greater power to detain when it 
acts in league with another nation, because the judiciary will be less 
likely to find review of that detention appropriate.  This synergistic 
                                                          
 180. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 181. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004) (explaining that habeas corpus is “[a] 
writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party’s 
imprisonment or detention is not illegal”). 
 182. Chemerinsky, supra note 170, at 434. 
 183. For example, reports have surfaced that a former Guantanamo detainee, Said Ali al-Shihri, 
has become the deputy leader of Al Qaeda’s Yemeni branch.  Robert F. Worth, Freed by the U.S., 
Saudi Becomes a Qaeda Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A1. 
 184. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 185. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260 (majority opinion). 
 186. Id. 
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concept does not add up; if anything, it seems this should give the 
Executive less free reign because, as the Court notes, it is answerable to 
another nation.187  The Boumediene Court also noted that hearing a writ 
for habeas would not likely upset the Cuban government.188  Perhaps this 
consideration will create an incentive to hold detainees in a country 
where the government would become upset if American laws were 
employed.  This begs the question, why should the Executive suddenly 
become more powerful when its laws are not favored?  Perhaps the Court 
was making the assumption that the individual would be entitled to the 
other country’s rule of law, and therefore the Executive would be less 
responsible to ensure justice. 
Perhaps this territorial sovereignty element is meant to protect 
against the fear of a writ that cannot be suspended.  There is an argument 
that if the writ can only be suspended in times of invasion and rebellion, 
then the writ may only extend to territories of America, because 
otherwise an invasion or rebellion in those areas would not technically be 
an invasion of America, and therefore the writ would not be subject to 
suspension.189  First, there does not seem to be any language in the 
Suspension Clause that suggests such a piecemeal restriction to 
suspension.190  It seems conceivable that, especially in the case of an 
invasion of the fifty states, the same public policy reasons would apply 
for requiring the suspension everywhere; namely, preventing further 
invasion by detaining individuals suspected of invading.  Furthermore, 
the balance of power element of this argument would support the 
conclusion of this Comment.  This argument suggests that the writ 
should not extend to areas where Congress could not suspend it, 
presumably to retain the balance of power between branches.  Using that 
logic, the writ should extend to any area where the Executive detains, in 
order to maintain a balance of power with the judiciary. 
There is a recurring theme amongst the three prongs of the test: they 
are focused on the individual.  The absurdity of the outcome of such a 
test becomes clear when it is framed in terms of the Executive’s actions; 
                                                          
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 2261. 
 189. See J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 463, 523 (2007) (“Assuming that the writ should not be available anywhere that the political 
branches could not, if the public safety required, temporarily suspend it, the writ should only be 
available in territory over which the United States exercises such pervasive and persistent 
sovereignty that a hostile military incursion could be fairly described as an ‘invasion’ vis-à-vis the 
United States, or an armed insurrection could fairly be described as a ‘rebellion’ vis-à-vis the United 
States.”). 
 190. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
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the Executive somehow becomes more powerful when it is operating 
against a non-citizen outside the borders of the United States.  This 
conclusion is counterintuitive.  Granted, this test does make sense when 
considering it in terms of the individual, as the Court does—the United 
States should grant an individual fewer rights when that individual is a 
non-citizen located outside the United States.  The question then 
becomes, which is the proper paradigm to apply when deciding the scope 
of the writ of habeas corpus? 
It is vital to solve this problem in a manner that adequately restricts 
executive power.  All motives aside, the Executive has shown a great 
propensity to take advantage of the decisions of the Supreme Court when 
there is room to do so, thus exploiting the balance of power between the 
branches of government.191  In Boumediene, the judiciary has again 
designed an ineffective tool to determine the proper scope of habeas 
corpus because the Executive may still manipulate the test, just as it did 
under the old bright-line sovereignty test in Eisentrager.  Some might 
argue that the judiciary has done the right thing in not acting with too 
much haste.  As one author has noted, avoiding the true merits of a case 
might often be good for society, avoiding a clash between branches of 
government until the issue “might go away or be resolved politically.”192  
However, the characteristics of the war on terror make it less likely that 
the war will ever come to an “end” in the traditional sense—how can the 
United States make peace with an enemy that has no overt public face, 
no flag, no borders?193  For this reason, the issue of executive detention 
in the war on terror is unlikely to resolve itself anytime soon, making it 
illogical for the judiciary to employ the “wait and see” technique to avoid 
a clash with the Executive.  In the words of a different author, the proper 
solution “must be sufficiently robust to ensure that the U.S. government 
cannot reasonably contend that there is any place on earth entirely 
beyond the reach of law.”194  The Boumediene Court’s characterization 
of the problem as one of separation of powers suggests the proper 
solution. 
                                                          
 191. See supra Part II.A. 
 192. Martinez, supra note 19, at 1082. 
 193. See Michael Elliot, Why the War on Terror Will Never End, TIME, May 26, 2003, at 27, 30 
(noting that the destruction of Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan had the unintended effect of 
dispersing terrorists to many different regions such as “Chechnya, Yemen, East Africa and Georgia’s 
Pankisi Gorge”). 
 194. Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 16, at 643. 
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C. A Separation of Powers Problem Demands a Separation of Powers 
Solution 
In approaching the habeas issue from either the individual rights or 
separation of powers viewpoint, one can see that both make sense.  In 
examining historical studies aimed at determining the scope of the writ, a 
wealth of language appears suggesting the original purpose was to 
restrict the King’s power, although, an equal amount of language appears 
referring to the prisoner’s right to challenge the legality of his 
detention.195  The Court’s opinion in Boumediene also speaks in terms of 
both separation of powers and individual rights, and the opinion is itself 
an indication of this symbiotic relationship, framing the problem at hand 
in terms of separation of powers and providing a solution in terms of 
individual rights.  Rather than try to argue that one approach is better in 
determining what action the judiciary should be taking, a better analysis 
is to simply accept that the concepts are inseparable when it comes to the 
writ of habeas corpus.  There is no way to check executive power using 
habeas review without extending some sort of individual right to the 
person being detained.  Any sort of habeas review aimed at not extending 
individual rights would be impossible, because presumably the illegality 
of any detention would stem from the right of an innocent detainee to be 
free.  In other words, the check on executive power fails without a 
consideration of the prisoner’s individual rights. 
Understanding this mutually dependent relationship makes 
reconciling the value of the separation of powers with the highly 
criticized approach of dictating international fundamental rights very 
difficult.  One option is for the Court to proceed as it did in Boumediene 
and let the concern of seeming overly “cosmopolitan”196 reign in its test 
for extension of the writ, resulting in an empowered executive, out of 
balance with the judiciary.  Alternatively, the Court could strive to 
ensure the Executive’s power is properly checked, and accept that 
extension of individual rights may be an ancillary consequence of that 
goal.  The pertinent inquiry then must focus on which path will have a 
more significant impact upon the Nation. 
The Court’s focus on an imbalance in the separation of powers in 
Boumediene implies the Court had greater concern for the ramifications 
resulting from such an imbalance than the ramifications resulting from 
extending individual rights.  In other words, the Court did not 
                                                          
 195. See supra Part II.B. 
 196. Posner, supra note 133, at 23. 
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characterize the problem as one involving a dilemma over the level of 
individual rights that should be properly afforded to the detainees.  
Obviously the separation of powers issue was important to the Court, 
which makes it all the more curious that it focused on the individual 
aspect in delivering the resolution of that issue.  In doing so, the Court 
considered all the major drawbacks in extending the writ, but failed to 
consider the major drawbacks that come with leaving the Executive free 
reign to detain in certain parts of the world, and under certain 
circumstances. 
Failing to properly balance the power between the executive and 
judicial branches, one could argue, results in a direct harm to the 
American people in that it undermines the philosophy of democracy 
upon which the United States was built.  It is a curious thing indeed 
when a country wages war in the name of upholding democracy, and 
then sacrifices the balance of power so fundamental to democracy in 
order to attain that end.  This is undoubtedly what Justice Stevens was 
referring to in his quote from Rumsfeld v. Padilla—that we must not 
fight tyranny with tyranny,197 because that taints what America 
represents.  Justice Stevens suggests there is some innate value in the 
American way, symbolized by the flag.  In that same vein, there is innate 
value in the idea of the separation of powers, where even if the Executive 
is not acting directly against the American people, something is lost 
because the Executive’s actions do not comport with our traditional 
notions of a checks-and-balances system.  As Justice Black stated in 
Reid, “[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.  Its 
power and authority have no other source.”198  Any time the Executive 
acts outside what the Constitution allows, it begins to undermine the 
Constitution itself.  When the Court cannot review executive detentions 
through the writ of habeas corpus, the American system of checks and 
balances is compromised, and the American people are harmed as the 
American system of government begins to mean less.  The only method 
of truly assuring a check on executive power is to allow habeas review 
anytime the Executive detains any person, in any place.  Under this 
method, there is no geographic location and no impractical scenario that 
the Executive could create that would prevent the judicial branch from 
ensuring that the innocent are not held captive for years on end. 
                                                          
 197. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 198. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Lahkdar Boumediene’s situation has been improved by the Court’s 
holding in the Supreme Court decision that bears his name.  The 
Boumediene decision has finally taken a threshold issue off the table—
the writ of habeas corpus does indeed extend to Lahkdar.  The legal 
battle became more linear for Guantanamo detainees in the sense that 
now the only issue is what process habeas corpus requires if the 
Executive is going to provide a substitute for federal courts.  Arguably, 
this method of substituting military commissions still violates separation 
of powers, because an arm of the Executive, the military, is reviewing 
the detentions.  However, this is a problem outside the scope of this 
Comment.  Regardless of the outcome on that issue, the legal dilemma of 
extraterritorial habeas will continue long into the future.  Now that the 
President has ordered Guantanamo closed within one year,199 it is unclear 
how the “practicality” factors will apply in another geographic location, 
not to mention the fate of prisoners in the inevitable conflicts in the 
future of our Nation. 
The Guantanamo Bay scenario has put on display the Executive’s 
propensity to abuse the scope of habeas corpus, nullifying the writ’s 
essential function of putting the power of executive detention in check—
a check whose vital purpose is to ensure innocents are not harmed.  In 
Boumediene, the Court acknowledged this problem of an imbalance of 
power.200  In an attempt to employ stare decisis, the Court recalled the 
Insular Cases in a questionable manner, allowing the Court to avoid 
appearing overly cosmopolitan.  The result was an outcome that is open 
to further abuse; perhaps not in the immediate future, but surely at some 
point.  Due to the test laid down in Boumediene, an overzealous 
executive might manipulate the test in the name of protecting democracy, 
and the next Lakhdar Boumediene again may have to endure a four-year 
legal battle just to decide a threshold issue—that the writ extends to him.  
The Court missed its opportunity to ensure that no future executive will 
employ a method of tyranny in combating tyranny. 
Rather than proceed with such an awkward interpretation of 
precedent to avoid the taboo nature of extending fundamental rights, the 
Court should have simply focused on restricting the Executive’s power.  
The writ of habeas corpus was designed to restrain the King’s power, and 
not even the King was above the law that provided this right.  Our 
                                                          
 199. Shane, supra note 14. 
 200. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008). 
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modern equivalent of the King is the executive branch, yet the writ’s 
purpose still holds true; therefore, we simply cannot allow the Executive 
to manipulate its application.  The best way to ensure this is to allow 
every person detained by the executive branch—at any time and in any 
place—to assert the writ of habeas corpus. 
 
